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THE HOUSE OF THE LAW*
Honorable Ruggero . Aldisert**
The time is ripe to take a critical look at what federal courts are
doing to our house of the law. I believe that both the timing and the view
are significant. The timing is appropriate because we are only one year
from the celebration of the bicentennial of the federal Constitution. We
are also only three years from the bicentennial of the Judiciary Act of
1789.
My view will be that of an insider; it will be through a jaundiced eye.
It will be the focus of one who is in his twenty-fifth year as a judge, a
judge on both the state and federal benches. It is through the eyes of a
student of the judicial process, of one who concentrates not so much on
the nuances of substantive or procedural law, but on the tools of deci-
sion-making. What these eyes see, in short, is this: a system in which
there is too much pettifogging about gingerbread and encrustation in the
trimmings of our house, and too little attention paid to its basic struc-
tures-to the fundamental precepts upon which the house of the law is
built.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LAW OBSCURED
In observing the house of the law today, I have extreme difficulty in
recognizing the eclectic components of its architecture. Surely, there is a
Georgian front and a Queen Anne behind, but the design tinkering just
starts with that. We have added porches, screened them in and, finally,
expanded them, helter skelter, into a series of rooms. Perched on top we
see a hip roof, a gable or two, and a mansard, along with a generous
sprinkling of skylights. Originally, the house was clapboard; then some-
one added a touch of brick here and there. At spots there is aluminum
siding and you can see countless layers of paint in a rainbow of colors in
various stages of adhesion and peeling. Parts of the house of law seem
firmly grounded and appear able to withstand the challenges of changing
judicial winds; other parts are quite fragile.
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What Henry Maine once said of the infiltration of Roman law into
Western thought also may describe our house: "nearly buried in a
parasitical overgrowth of modern speculative doctrine."' The architect
of the finished product resembles not so much Thomas Jefferson at Mon-
ticello but Rube Goldberg. Yet we know that because ninety-five percent
of federal court work is interpreting statutes and constitutional clauses,
and because this interpretation proceeds in the common law tradition of
lawyers and judges, we cannot expect a Palladio as an architect. We
cannot follow the common law tradition and still guarantee clean lines
and symmetry as we develop the law. "We have thought less of symme-
try than of the advancement of knowledge," Maitland told us.2 Under
the case-by-case method, we cannot expect the elegantiajuris of the origi-
nal Twelve Tables of Rome or the unannotated Ten Commandments of
Moses. We cannot look for the crisp order we see in the Napoleonic
Code or the clean statutes prepared by the Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws. We cannot expect this because we know that the common
law tradition is a "byzantine beauty," a method "of reaching what in-
stinctively seems the right results in a series of cases, and only later (if at
all) enunciating the principle that explains the pattern-a sort of con-
nect-the-dots exercise." 3
We know that a gulf will always exist between the scientific theory
of law and the practical doing of it. As Emerson said, "[w]e boil at dif-
ferent degrees." 4 The lawyer has to be more than a historian. The law-
yer's knowledge is an inversion of "real" or "scientific" history. The
lawyer seeks authority, and the newer the authority the better, because
that is what the courts seek. By comparison, the historian seeks evi-
dence-the older the evidence, the closer it is to the event, the better.5
Notwithstanding the common law tradition, and notwithstanding
the absence of pristine pure lines in our house of law, it was still possible,
until the recent era, to identify familiar disciplines of the law as we
looked upon its house. Fundamental foundations and structures were
always there to see. Although we constantly modified and tinkered with
its profile, a physiognomy of the law was there to recognize.
1. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 359 (1861).
2. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW XXXviii (2d ed.
1899).
3. Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values,
92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 32 (1978) (citing Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 351-52 (1974)).
4. R.W. EMERSON, SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE 92 (1870).
5. Barnes, Introduction to 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW at 9 (1982).
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We knew much about contracts. We were familiar with tort doc-
trines of fault liability and due care and foreseeability. We knew that
once upon a time there was a property right in a good reputation. We
knew that strictures papered our commercial transactions. We knew
something about common law trespass, assumpsit, replevin, ejectment
and mandamus. We knew precepts of equity, definitions of common law
crimes and a touch of constitutional law.
These fundamental legal precepts became either immediately recog-
nizable or reasonably retrievable. There was much of what Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes described as "predictability," of what Karl Llewelynn called
"reckonability" to the law. Dean Roscoe Pound summed it up for us:
What we are talking about, then, is the body of authoritative
materials, and the authoritative gradation of the materials,
wherein judges are to find the grounds of decision, counsellors
the basis of assured prediction as to the course of decision, and
individuals reasonable guidance toward conducting themselves
in accordance with the demands of the social order. This point
of view assumes a developed social and economic order and a
corresponding development of the legal order, with an organ-
ized judicial and administrative hierarchy, definite law giving
and law declaring agencies, and above all a developed profes-
sion of advisors upon the legal conduct of affairs.6
We were able to possess what Hugo Grotius described in the seven-
teenth century as "a power of discrimination which enables [us] to decide
what things are agreeable or harmful as to both things present and things
to come."
7
We knew that a court's expression had the force of law, yet we knew
that this force was proficient and efficient only to the extent that its ex-
pression was clear and its reasoning persuasive. We knew that public
acceptance of judicial expression was directly proportionate to an under-
standing of what was said and done and why; that this was but a para-
phrase of lex plus laudatur quando ratione probatur (the law is most
praiseworthy when it is consonant with reason). But we also knew that
there may be a conflict between justice according to law and the aequum
et bonum (that which is fair and good). We also knew that the good
judge always has an unquenchable thirst for justice.
The brilliance of the common law tradition is that for every decision
6. Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV.
475, 476 (1933).
7. 1 H. GROTIUS, THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE 13 (1646) (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
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there must be a reason, clearly stated, in which justification appears as a
clear-cut syllogism. The major premise takes the form of a broad legal
precept that contains a factual subject and a legal predicate. The minor
premise, too, is always factual, and it must relate to the subject of the
major premise. The conclusion depends either on an agreement or a dif-
ference between the major premise and the minor premise.
Have things changed? I think so.
I have an abiding concern that most briefs from lawyers and many
opinions from judges seem to have lost their way. Many no longer ap-
pear as instruments of persuasion or explanation; rather, they appear as
instruments of commentary, resembling more a ritualistic exercise than a
decision-making tool.
A promiscuous uttering of citations has replaced the crisply stated,
clean lines of legal reasoning. In judicial opinions, especially those of the
United States Supreme Court, we see a mishmash of citation in text and
footnote. Spewing case after case has replaced a tidy explanation of what
is important in the case and a clean description of why it is important. It
is not too unkind to suggest that often what poses as a work of scholar-
ship is actually a work of journalism. "[A] pennyworth of content is
most frequently concealed beneath a pound of so-called style."'
Barbara W. Tuchman recently sounded a call for "clear, easy-read-
ing prose" in today's writing community. She asked all writers to avoid
"the Latinized language of academics with their endless succession of
polysyllables, their deaf ear for sentence structure, and unconcern for
clarity."9 Over sixty years ago, Benjamin Cardozo warned that
precedents [should not be] ultimate sources of the law, supply-
ing the sole equipment that is needed for the legal armory, the
sole tools, to borrow Maitland's phrase, "in the legal smithy."
Back of precedents are the basic juridical concepts that are the
postulants of judicial reasoning, and farther back are the habits
of life, the institutions of society, in which those conceptions
had their origin, and which, by process of interaction they have
modified in turn.1
Cardozo condemned, and properly so, the color matching process. He
warned against a process of search, comparison and little more, stating:
Some judges seldom get beyond that process in any case.
Their notion of their duty is to match the colors of the case at
8. Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936).
9. Tuehman, An Author's Mail, 54 THE AM. SCHOLAR 313, 322 (1985).
10. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19 (1921).
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hand against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon
their desk. The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable
rule. But, of course, no system of living law can be evolved by
such a process, and no judge of a high court, worthy of his
office, views the function of his place so narrowly. If that were
all there was to our calling, there would be little of intellectual
interest about it. The man who had the best card index of the
cases would also be the wisest judge.I x
A stuffy style and fluffy padding in appellate court opinions (and I
sadly include myself among the participants and perpetrators) shows that
we suffer from acute pedantry. We seem to forget that all lawyers and
judges are professional writers. Professional writers are aware that
prose, like any other art, calls for frequent compromise among desirable
aims-sound and sense, force and fluidity, clearness and precision, em-
phasis and nuance, wit and truth. The very need for balance rules out
consistency in the use of any component of writing. Each sentence and
paragraph is a special case. 2 Yet all of us-judges and lawyers alike-
are guilty of bombastic propositions and legal dialectics in "[1ong
sentences, awkward constructions, and fuzzy-wuzzy words that seem to
apologize for daring to venture an opinion."' 3
We know how to be turgid and turbid, without blinking an eye, and
indeed, without seeming to know what these words mean. Multisyllabic
jargon and verbal distortions are the rule not the exception, and fit within
the newly coined word "Haigese," because former Secretary of State Al-
exander Haig used them so often. The story is told that one of General
Haig's aides asked for a raise. Haig just could not answer the request
with a one word, "No." Instead he replied: "'Because of the fluctua-
tional predisposition of your position's productive capacity as juxtaposed
to government standards, it would be momentarily injudicious to advo-
cate an increment.' "'1
We suffer a chronic case of literary hiccups. We insert citations as
often as possible, three or four in a simple declaratory sentence, irrespec-
tive of how they interfere with the flow of the prose, the rhythm of the
presentations or the sense of the argument. Somehow we do not seem to
care that such static impedes easy comprehension of a statement of
reasons.
I say all this not to suggest that effective legal writing should be
11. Id. at 20-21.
12. Barzun, Behind the Blue Pencil, 54 THE AM. SCHOLAR 385, 387-88 (1985).
13. Rodell, supra note 8, at 39.
14. A. DENNING, THE CLOSING CHAPTER 62 (1983) (quoting Alexander Haig).
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graded for literary style for the sake of style. Rather, I emphasize this
problem because the purpose of all legal writing is persuasion. Without
clear writing, communication is lessened, and to the extent communica-
tion is diminished, the powers of persuasion decline.
The purpose of a brief is persuasion, as a lawyer must convince the
judicial reader of the rightness of his cause. Similarly, the purpose of a
judicial opinion is to convince any reader that sound reasons support the
court's decision. In this sense, both lawyers and judges are salesmen.
The rebuke that is flung in the face of Willy Loman in Death of a Sales-
man comes to mind: "The only thing you got in this world is what you
can sell. And the funny thing is that you're a salesman, and you don't
know that."'15 Excessive citation, excessive footnoting, excessive ped-
antry in bloated awkwardness are at least three horsemen that run
against your sole purpose: to sell your argument to your readers.
Unfortunately, the paradigm for stilted writing is found in our
Supreme Court. As a judge and a lawyer, there is no Court I admire so
much as that one, and no judge I respect so much as those nine justices.
I say nothing in derogation of their solutions to difficult decisions and
their discharge of profound responsibilities. But as a student of the judi-
cial process, I cannot stand mute as too many courts-state and fed-
eral-and too many lawyers-trial and appellate-mimic the United
States Supreme Court's opinion writing style. What results is a style that
unnecessarily emphasizes minor or trivial points of learning, shows a
questionable sense of propriety (or proportion), and fails to recognize the
difference between what is important and what is merely interesting. Or,
put less delicately, this writing style fails to recognize the difference be-
tween what is necessary and what is pseudo-academic show and tell.
I would like to share with you some case histories of acute, if not
chronic, "citation-itis." In the recent school prayer case, the Supreme
Court had to use 135 citations to state what it concluded to be the obvi-
ous;16 in the recent civil RICO case, 114 citations;17 in a recent copyright
case, 164 citations.18 The more serious aspect of this problem, however,
is that the disease is contagious. Thus, in my own court, in a case involv-
ing an award of attorney's fees, there were 199 citations;19 and in another
case handed down the same month, the majority required 188 citations to
15. A. MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 97 (1949).
16. Wallace v. Jaifree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
17. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
18. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
19. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897 (3d Cir. 1985).
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discuss appropriate sanctions for an attorney's misconduct.2'
The common law tradition demands no more than a clear statement
of reasons. The judicial process expects no more; the brief reader or the
opinion reader deserves no less.
The gift of exquisite writing is precisely that-a gift, either acquired
by nature or perfected by years of studious attention. But, unfortunately,
if lean, clear expression is not a natural gift, the writer must have the
time to contemplate and reflect, to write and rewrite, all at a leisurely
pace that is not present in the modern era of the law. Today, time is a
severely rationed asset. Yet techniques are at hand to improve writing
style. There are methods to use and standards to follow, techniques and
methods that can bring about vast improvements in the exposition of the
law in both our briefs and opinions.
What is needed is first to terminate the promiscuous citation shuf-
fling in text: those boring expositions of who said what to whom. Take a
second look at those awful footnotes that confer a lack of authority in the
text or admit that the argument's main structure can, upon closer analy-
sis, prove to be very fragile. Perhaps Francis Bacon was correct when he
criticized legal writers who write as philosophers: "They make imagi-
nary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the
stars, which give little light because they are so high."2
Every brief and every opinion should ideally begin with a clear state-
ment of the precise flash point of controversy. We must identify pre-
cisely where the litigants differ and tell the reader whether that clash
concerns the choice of the controlling legal precept or the interpretation
of an agreed-upon precept, or-if no dispute over choice or interpreta-
tion is involved-a statement that the sole quarrel concerns applying set-
tled law to settled facts. Having identified these contours, we should
then proceed to resolve the difficulty and explain why one choice is supe-
rior to another or why one interpretation or given application is
preferred.
There must be more clarity in the ratio decidendi, more understand-
ing of the precise analysis and more selective use of precedent. Lawyers
and judges both have an obligation to evaluate the effect of previous cases
and to decide what citations do authenticate and which simply duplicate,
which are necessary to the argument, and which are used only to validate
obvious statements of reason.
20. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985).
21. F. BACON, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, BOOK If (1605), quoted in 3 THE
WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 475 (J. Spedding ed. 1876).
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I can anticipate the response to this criticism. It would probably
follow two lines of attack. First, one might say that the common law
tradition demands authority in the brief and in the opinion. One will
argue that as the law develops over the years, more authority and more
precedent is available for citation, and that this proliferation of authority
is the reason why more cases are cited today than in the era of Oliver
Wendall Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo and Learned Hand. One could ar-
gue that West Publishing Company reports over 62,000 appellate cases
each year. One can say that because the common law tradition is an
incremental process, the more it develops, the more authority is avail-
able, and the more authority, the more extensive the writing.
The second argument would emphasize that we are in the midst of a
congressional law explosion and a tournament to see which agency can
proliferate the most regulations. At least 100 bills to expand federal ju-
risdiction are proposed each year. This legislative and administrative
blast fattens the body of law and adds more structures, willy nilly, to the
house of the law.
I concede the validity of these arguments, but permit me to offer a
rebuttal. Upon close analysis, new statutes, regulatory in form, do little
more than add a gloss to a small number of long-recognized disciplines of
the law. To regulate business practices, these acts simply provide that
idiosyncratic definitions such as fraud may be used in conjunction with
time-tested tort principles,22 or set standards to interpret contracts23 or
proclaim restrictions in the use of real or personal property24 or restrict
liberties25 or declare certain conduct to be an offense against society.26
Most congressional activity in the criminal field is to deem a federal
crime conduct that was fairly well recognized as a state crime, or, arbi-
trarily, to make a violation of a certain federal regulation a penal offense.
22. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
23. See, e.g., Investment Companies and Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(46) (1982) ("valid-
ity of contracts"); 41 U.S.C. § 10b (1982) (contracts for public works); 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1982)
("yellow dog" contracts).
24. See, e.g., Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 187 (1982) (restrictions on assign-
ment or subletting of leases); 21 U.S.C. § 123 (1982) (Secretary of Agriculture authorized to
quarantine livestock); 21 U.S.C. § 331(f) (1982) (refusal to permit entry or inspection of prem-
ises prohibited); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1256 (1982) (per-
mit required to engage in strip mining).
25. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1982) (prohibition on child la-
bor); 26 U.S.C. § 6702 (1982) (statute used to prosecute tax protestors for filing frivolous tax
returns).
26. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO), tit. IX, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982) (federal treble damage remedy for
conspiracy to commit fraud).
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To the precedent explosion argument, my answer is that very few
federal cases really bring about fundamental changes in the law. Most of
the federal appellate cases reported each year come within two categories
suggested by Cardozo more than sixty years ago: those in which "[tihe
law and its application alike are plain" and those in which "the rule of
law is certain, and the application alone doubtful."27 In my view, ninety
percent of the cases in the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit fall
within these two categories.28 This leaves only ten percent of our swollen
caseload "where a decision one way or the other, will count for the fu-
ture, will advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the devel-
opment of the law."29
Our British cousin Lord Patrick Devlin would agree. He has sug-
gested "that at least nine-tenths of the judiciary spends its life submerged
in the disinterested application of known law. Indeed, to say that one-
tenth rises above the waterline that is marked by notice in the legal jour-
27. B. CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 164.
28. Cardozo estimated that at least nine-tenths of appellate cases in 1924 "could not, with
semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one." B. CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW
60 (1924). In 1961, Judge Henry Friendly wrote: "Indeed, Cardozo's nine-tenths estimate
probably should be read as referring to the first category alone. Thus reading it, Professor
Harry W. Jones finds it 'surprising' on the high side.... So would I. If it includes both
categories, I would not." Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE
L.J. 218, 222-23 (1961) (quoting Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism,
61 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 803 n.16 (1961)).
29. B. CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 165. Cardozo stated:
Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit, a majority, I think, could not,
with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. The law and its applica-
tion alike are plain. Such cases are predestined, so to speak, to affirmance without
opinion. In another and considerable percentage, the rule of law is certain, and the
application alone doubtful. A complicated record must be dissected, the narratives
of witnesses, more or less incoherent and unintelligible, must be analyzed, to deter-
mine whether a given situation comes within one district or another upon the chart
of rights and wrongs. The traveler who knows that a railroad crosses his path must
look for approaching trains. That is at least the general rule. In numberless litiga-
tions the description of the landscape must be studied to see whether vision has been
obstructed, whether something has been done or omitted to put the traveler off his
guard. Often these cases and others like them provoke difference of opinion among
judges. Jurisprudence remains untouched, however, regardless of the outcome. Fi-
nally there remains a percentage, not large indeed, and yet not so small as to be
negligible, where a decision one way or the other, will count for the future, will
advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the development of the law.
These are the cases where the creative element in the judicial process finds its oppor-
tunity and power. It is with these cases that I have chiefly concerned myself in all
that I have said to you. In a sense it is true of many of them that they might be
decided either way. By that I mean that reasons plausible and fairly persuasive
might be found for one conclusion as for another. Here come into play that balanc-
ing of judgment, that testing and sorting of considerations of analogy and logic and
utility and fairness, which I have been trying to describe. Here it is that the judge
assumes the function of a lawgiver.
Id. at 164-66.
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nals would probably be an exaggeration.
30
Our infatuation with citing precedent is no new phenomenon. No
less a critic than James Boswell had this to say in Life of Samuel John-
son: "Dr. Johnson observed that 'authority from personal respect has
much weight with most people, and often more than reasoning.' "31 Dr.
Johnson also said "[tihe more precedents there are, the less occasion is
there for law; that is to say, the less occasion is there for investigation
principles., 32 I suggest that these words can be said to be reporting the
state of current legal writing. Although the cases are there to cite by the
hundreds, if not thousands, few add very much to legal fundamentals.
Moreover, overcitation creates the impression that American law has un-
dergone massive changes. As I shall later emphasize, this simply is not
true. Overcitation is both a self-fulfilling prophecy and a self-inflicted
wound.
The brute fact is that not all past cases are currently of equal value,
and briefs and opinions should reflect an honest rate of exchange. An
authoritative gradation of legal precepts does exist. Some precedents are
much more important than others. Recognizing that a hierarchy of
value exists is essential if judges are to find the proper grounds of deci-
sion; lawyers, the basis of assured prediction as to the course of decision;
and members of society, reasonable guidance toward conducting them-
selves in accordance with the demands of social order. But more impor-
tant-much more important-is the necessity to bring more order to the
design of law by identifying clearly, and at the earliest opportunity, the
fundamental family of law implicated in the case.
Let me return to the house of the law. We must be able to identify
its architectural lines. We should know front, rear and side elevations,
and floor plans of each component. If each legal decision builds on an-
other, deft hands must stack each building block in its proper place. Our
house must appear as majestic as a cathedral and not as a frazzled parcel
for urban renewal.
The time has come for the legal profession to simplify, rather than
to complicate, current legal issues. The time has come to identify exactly
what fundamentals underlie the controversy in each case, and to isolate
which is the governing branch of the law's family tree. Our first step in
any legal argument must be to look at the tree's trunk and main
branches, rather than to concentrate on new twigs that continually
sprout in all directions.
30. P. DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 4 (1979).
31. J. BOSWELL, LiFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 615 (1906).
32. Id. at 416.
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This analysis must be made because the starting point of every judi-
cial decision must be a recognition of the controlling dogma, doctrine
and fundamental principles. Only this recognition will permit our deci-
sions to be both consistent and coherent. This call for more simplicity
and more order in briefs and opinions will cause us not to regress, but to
progress. This call will create better communication between lawyer and
judge and between judge and community. This call will seek to remove
from judicial decisions that which is idiosyncratic, and in its place will
attempt to establish predictability and reckonability.
II. THE FIVE SUPEREMINENT PRINCIPLES
The law explosion-reflected by statute or case law, by the new
causes of action churned out by Congress, by the nuances of specialized
government regulation, or by the geometric expansion of law school cur-
ricula-has not spawned a corresponding increase in bedrock concepts
upon which modern law and modern litigation rest. Fundamentals of
law remain. They still loom large and foreboding, but will be more easily
seen once we blow away mists that surround them.
I am prepared to defend the thesis that all substantive law including
constitutional law, is but a spin-off of five fundamentals that you and I
learned in our first year of law school:
1. Creating and protecting property interests;
2. Creating and protecting liberty interests;
3. Fulfilling promises;
4. Redressing losses caused by breach or fault;
5. Punishing those who wrong the public.33
To deserve the accolade of "supereminence," the principles must
demonstrate two critical characteristics: Their presence must be vigor-
ously felt and clearly recognized in most current federal litigation, and
they must prove a philosophical kinship to some hefty ancestors. In
these two very important aspects, I think that the "big five" pass with
flying colors. Let me turn now to the first of these.
33. Certainly by 1646, perhaps by 1609, Hugo Grotius had written:
This maintenance of the social order... is the source of law properly so called. To
this sphere of law belong the abstaining from that which is another's, the restoration
to another of anything of his which we may have, together with any gain which we
may have received from it; the obligation to fulfill promises, the making good of a
loss incurred through our fault, and the inflicting of penalties upon men according to
their deserts.
1 H. GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
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A. Creating and Protecting Property Interests
Although the supereminent principles form the main structure of
the house of the law, I am not prepared to extend the metaphor to sug-
gest that each constitutes a separate room in our mansion. This is be-
cause some litigation encompasses more than one major legal discipline.
For example, antitrust law always incorporates the supereminent princi-
ple of contract law in determining the existence of an agreement, but also
embraces tort law in ascertaining damages in civil actions and criminal
law where prosecutions have been instituted.
Moreover, because each principle constitutes part of the foundation
of our house, we must examine the foundation of each. To know what
we are, we must first know what we were; and to appreciate what we
were requires a return to the beginnings of each precept. Although such
a return is important for all the precepts we will discuss, it is especially
important in our examination of property law.
Unlike a liberty interest, where freedom is presumed unless re-
stricted by custom, tradition or positive law, a property right, or more
properly a personal right to a property interest, requires some act, per-
formance or effort. Although the earliest acquisitions of these rights are
shrouded in unrecorded or fragmented history, we are treated to several
interesting theories. First, Blackstone suggested that property rights are
originally based upon possession, hypothesizing that "the ground was in
common, and no part of it was the permanent property of any man in
particular; yet whoever was in the occupation of any determined spot of
it, for rest, for shade, or the like, acquired for the time a sort of owner-
ship . .. ,.1 An aphorism of the German legal philosopher Savigny
seems to support this view: all property rights are based on adverse pos-
session ripened by prescription.35 Yet others would simplify the quality
of acts necessary for primitive ownership in the far away dawn of prop-
erty law. Their theory begins with the concept that everything ought to
have an owner and that under Roman law there was a concept known as
res nullius, an object which is not, or had never been, reduced to domin-
ion. Therefore, the possessor is permitted to become the proprietor from
a feeling that all valuable things are naturally the subjects of exclusive
enjoyment. The occupant, in short, becomes the owner, not through ad-
verse possesion or prescription, but because all things are presumed to be
somebody's property and because no one can be pointed out as having a
34. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3.
35. H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 247.
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better right than he to the proprietorship of this particular thing.
3 6
Hence, the popular American lay expression: "Possession is nine-tenths
of the law!"
Property law is probably the most ancient method of protecting re-
corded legal rights. In most societal forms, including the present as well
as the very old, property law concerns rights of possession, use, aliena-
tion and succession. In America most of these attributes are governed by
state law and, by far, most property litigation takes place in state courts.
But the federal courts also find themselves deeply immersed in this most
ancient legal discipline, especially in the recent era. It therefore also de-
serves its rank as one of the five supereminent principles.
The definition of legally protected property rights evolved largely
from the regulation of property ownership and use. In ancient societies,
it focused most generally on the rules of succession to, or transfer of, real
and personal property. In the Western world there is a large body of
written property law, recorded from the promulgation of the Justinian
Institutes in the year 533 through Blackstone's Commentaries in the
eighteenth century. As legal systems became more sophisticated over the
centuries, however, the nature of legally cognizable interests expanded
dramatically. Thus, today property may be an object of physical exist-
ence or an intangible, such as a patent right, a chose in action, a right to
retain a driver's license, or a right to retain a position in a university
tenure stream. In a broader sense a personal right to property goes even
further and includes concepts of not causing injury to a person's good
reputation, fireside and shelter, spouse, child, cow, Ferrari, or copyright.
The concept also includes not interfering with rights to Social Security
benefits and not interfering with marital, divorce, inheritance, stock-
holder, security or partnership rights.
Today protectable property interests transcend traditional notions
of the ownership of Blackacre in fee simple absolute or possessing a right
to recover for conversion of a chattel. While the federal presence in these
traditional areas of property law is comparatively small, federal courts
frequently adjudicate disputes implicating modem notions of property.
As the Supreme Court has observed:
Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form
of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law con-
cepts of property. It has been aptly noted that "[s]ociety today
is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his
franchise, the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the
36. Id. at 248.
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worker his union membership, contract, and pension rights, the
executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to aid
security and independence. Many of the most important of
these entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to
farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for
television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and
education; social security pensions for individuals. Such
sources of security, whether private or public, are no longer re-
garded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essen-
tials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity. '3 7
So viewed, there exists more architectural uniformity in our house of the
law than a cursory examination might reveal. Within the confines of this
first supereminent principle, many federal judiciary efforts can be charac-
terized as providing the vehicle by which persons can seek to protect
those property interests that have been created through positive law.
Furthermore, special additional protection is afforded those claim-
ing property interests as against deprivations occasioned by governmen-
tal conduct. Lavish layers of gloss added to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment--"[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law"-have accorded constitu-
tional protection to a variety of state-created property interests. In the
extensive body of law interpreting this clause, courts have identified in-
terests in property created by the state and have fashioned wide-ranging
protections that prevent the state from infringing upon those rights with-
out first respecting tenets of procedural due process. This means that
once a personal right to a property interest is acquired, a high premium is
placed on its free use; interference with that use by the state is stayed
unless protective proceedings are observed.
B. Creating and Protecting Liberty Interests
It was Benjamin Franklin who said, "[w]here liberty dwells, there is
my country." Liberty does dwell in our house of the law, and from the
perspective of a federal house of the law, or, if you will, a house of federal
law, it boasts a favored dweller status. It rates this special status because,
whether viewed as a jurisprudential concept or as a highly treasured pri-
vate interest, liberty is the spirit in our Nation's law that makes freedom
ring.
The private liberty interest that is protectable by the federal courts is
37. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (quoting Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)).
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a freedom on the part of one as against another or the state to do or not
to do a given act. It is the right to be left alone. It has been defined as
"the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's
intellect, interests, tastes and personality."38 Unlike many other private
interests, liberty to act may be presumed, unless restricted by custom,
tradition or positive law. This basic presumption may be traceable to
Roman law, especially to the ringing phrases of The Institutes of Justin-
ian: "Liberty, from which the expression free men is derived, is the natu-
ral ability to do anything one pleases unless it be prohibited by force or
law."39 In a more modem era, Eugene V. Rostow makes the point that
"[t]he root idea of the Constitution is that man can be free because the
state is not."'
No less than the exhortatory opening statement of the Constitution
catapults the individual liberty interest to the level of our supereminent
principles:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.4
Constitutional case law has now precisely identified certain liberty inter-
ests, for example: freedom of communication and religion, 42 freedom of
the individual, embracing many particulars, such as freedom from slav-
ery or peonage,43 freedom to travel,' freedom of enterprise and con-
tract,a' freedom to follow a chosen profession,46 freedom for individuals
in the expression of their personalities,47 and freedom from an establish-
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in Roe and in Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)) (italics omitted).
39. Et libertas quidem est, ex qua etiam liberi vocantur, naturalisfacultas eius quod
cuique facere libet, nisi si quid aut vi aut lure prohibetur.
INST. JUST. 1.3.1. For a translation and commentary on The Institutes, see J. THOMAS, THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, TExT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 13 (1975).
40. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193, 195
(1952).
41. U.S. CONT. preamble (emphasis added).
42. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) ("The fundamental law declares the
interest of the United States that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that free-
dom to communicate information and opinion be not abridged.").
43. U.S. CONT. amend. XIII.
44. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
45. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
46. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976).
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ment of religion. 48
Long before the current constitutional law explosion, the Supreme
Court summarized a liberty interest:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at com-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.
49
In the modem era we know that a personal right to liberty against
state action may be protected by the fourteenth amendment, and that
this right may arise from two sources-the due process clause itself and
the laws of the states.50 And at least where the personal right is a blend
of liberty and property interest, we also have been instructed that "tradi-
tional common-law remedies are fully adequate to afford due process."'"
In sum, whether viewed from the Justinian notions that everyone has
"the natural ability to do anything one pleases unless it be prohibited by
force or law," 2 or from the notion of custom or traditions, or by consti-
tutional clause or statute, the liberty interest has to be construed as one
of the premier federal law principles. Yet, as I have emphasized
elsewhere,
drawing the line between individual liberties and rights, on the
one hand, and those of government action for the larger good,
is still the perpetual question of constitutional law. And about
two thousand years before the Constitution, the same problem
bothered an ancient social order which spoke through Heracli-
48. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
49. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
50. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976).
51. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977). The Ingraham Court explained:
The right of personal security is also protected by the Fourth Amendment,
which was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth because its protec-
tion was viewed as "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty'.., enshrined in the
history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples." Wolfv.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). It has been said of the Fourth Amendment that
its "overriding function ... is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
But the principal concern of that Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is with intrusions on privacy in the course of criminal investiga-
tions. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977).
Id. at 673 n.42.
52. INST. JuST. 1.3.1; see supra note 39.
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tus: "The major problem of human society is to combine that
degree of liberty without which law is tyranny, with that degree
of law without which liberty becomes license."
53
C. Fulfilling Promises
Any house needs housekeeping rules. Our house of the law is no
exception. Prominent among our rules is that once the formalities of
making a binding promise are made, we will enforce that promise. This
housekeeping rule was not very important in primitive society, whether
pre-Roman in the Mediterranean area, or post-Roman in the Dark Ages
in England and on the European continent. But to the extent that socie-
ties confer upon their members the abundant accoutrements of better liv-
ing and the fruits of expansive commercial intercourse, this rule becomes
not only important, but essential. So it is in today's la dolce vita.
The increase in the quality of our social environment has bestowed
upon society members great benefits, comforts and conveniences. We
ride high in an era of rampant "plastic money," the credit-card vehicle of
buy now, pay later. In an era not too dimly past, the legal niceties of
contract law did not affect the average citizen and primarily attracted the
attention of those engaged in mercantile or commercial pursuits. But
rapid escalation of sophisticated consumer purchases, in quantity and
quality, has increased the number and amount of contractual relations in
the retail and wholesale levels as well as in distributing and manufactur-
ing. This effect is seen today in the federal courts, where thirty-five per-
cent of all civil filings sound in contract.5" Because of its formidable
effect on our economy, the concept of fulfilling promises easily deserves
our attention as a supereminent principle.
Modem commentators are surely right when they say that contract
law "reaches into the life of the individual, governing to some extent his
employment, his purchase and sale of land and goods, the insuring of his
possessions and the financing of these transactions. On a vaster scale it
enters into practically every aspect of domestic and international
trade."55
Included within the quid pro quo of traditional commercial contract
law are related property specialities, such as the sale or rental of good old
Blackacre in real estate law or the care and feeding of chattels and busi-
ness relations proposed under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
53. Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 CONN. L. REV. 181, 224 (1979).
54. UNITED STATES ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT 134 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as 1984 ANNUAL REPORT].
55. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 4 (2d ed. 1977).
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Our federal dockets are loaded with these cases, particularly diversity
actions based on commercial transactions under the UCC. And techno-
logical changes in electronic funds transfers and in investing, banking
and finance have added a dazzling myriad of new problems.
Of course, federal statutes have also contributed to the proliferation
of federal cases arising under the concept of fulfilling promises. During
the past half-century we have seen federalization of employment relation-
ships and contracts under the labor laws, providing federal court protec-
tion to practically all aspects of an employment contract, from the initial
stages of employee collectivization through bargaining for, executing and
enforcing the contract. Labor statutes provided jurisdiction for 11,821
cases before federal courts in 1984.56 Added to this profound body of
specialized contract law are the relatively new employment features of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which accounted for another 9748 employ-
ment-related cases in 1984.17 No less revolutionary in this field have
been the antitrust laws, wherein certain types of contracts are completely
outlawed. Such agreements were challenged in 1201 civil and criminal
cases last year.58 Finally, recent federal programs create essentially fiscal
promises, or contracts, between taxpayers and the federal government.
Normally, because of the intricate hurdles posed by standing require-
ments, a taxpayer cannot challenge an expenditure of tax funds by the
government. Yet there are exceptions, and these exceptions have
spawned a plethora of lawsuits. Under the Social Security Act, for exam-
ple, a covered employee may agree to pay money to the government for a
certain number of years or to perform certain services for the govern-
ment, with the understanding that by doing so he will be repaid in money
or services at a certain time as specified by the program. Although some
courts may regard these programs as creating quasi-property interests,
the overall quidpro quo aspect gives these programs a contractual flavor.
In 1984, nearly 30,000 Social Security actions were filed in United States
district courts.
Although the spectrum of these actions is rather vast, the starting
point for analyzing these problems is still the law of contracts, whether at
the common law, or, in the federal scheme, as modified by regulatory
statutes. More precisely, we must understand that our inheritance here
is more Roman than English, more the original practices of the Italian
city-states in the development of the law merchant than the contributions
56. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 133.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 133, 172.
HOUSE OF THE LAW
of the Normans or Anglo-Saxons.5 9 It is a legal discipline that develops
at the pace set by commercial intercourse. So intimately related to soci-
ety's economic growth, because America is the most highly developed
financial and commercial center of the world, this supereminent principle
has an importance second to none.
D. Redressing Losses Caused by Breach or Fault
If the prime contractors of the house of the law can be said to be
lovers of theory, as we have seen by their construction of property, lib-
erty and contract precepts, we can also say that they were realists. They
understood that all members of society would not respect the tenets and
that some provision had to be made to furnish a private remedy for those
who suffered at the hands of those who breached the law. If, in the most
primitive form, we took property belonging to another, the simplest rem-
edy was a court order commanding the malfeasor to give it back. Where
such a return was possible, we called it private actual redress of a breach
of conduct or fault. We then encountered what can be called the law of
Humpty-Dumpty:
Humpty-Dumpy sat on a wall,
Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall.
All the king's horses and all the king's men,
Could not put Humpty-Dumpty together again.
For example, the victim of a breach could not be put "together again"
because the stolen horse died or was injured, or the purloined grain was
consumed. Thus was created the notion of substituted redress or mone-
tary damages as compensation for the injury.
Like every system of adjudication, our house of the law provides
actual or substituted redress for the individual who has been injured by
the breach of contract or duty of conduct. The law of compensation is an
integral part of federal adjudication. Moreover, it is a supereminent
principle that has been present in organized societies in written form at
least since Biblical days. At that time, one who "hurt a field or vine-
yard" was required to "restore the best of whatsoever." This is classic
59. As Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland wrote in 1899:
The law of contract holds anything but a conspicuous place among the institu-
tions of English law before the Norman Conquest. In fact it is rudimentary. Many
centuries must pass away before it wins that dominance which we at the present day
concede to it. Even in the schemes of Hale and Blackstone it appears as a mere
supplement to the law of property.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 2, at 184. Similarly Coke or Littleton have little, if
anything, to say about contracts. See E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND (1823).
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actual tort redress. There was also substituted redress: He that kindled a
fire that burned his neighbor's stacks of corn had to make good the loss.
In event of "any fraud, either in ox, or in ass, or sheep, or raiment, or
anything that may bring damage," it took the form of "restor[ing]
double" to his neighbor.6 0
In federal courts, the law of damages most often takes the form of
substituted redress. Thus, although punitive damages are sometimes per-
mitted, compensatory money damages are awarded in the garden variety
tort action where fault is a predicate of liability. But recent case law has
permitted fault to be presumed, as in the diversity cases implicating strict
product liability, or in many regulatory statutes.61 Moreover, absence of
fault may be presumed, as in most defamation cases subsequent to New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.62 Fault also forms the underpinning of liabil-
ity that flows from corporate misrepresentations and derelictions. Also,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,63 fault comprises the basis for recovery not only
of compensatory damages, but also for punitive damages in cases where
malice is shown.64
Several recent developments have increased redress remedies in fed-
eral courts. Although the liability aspect of antitrust laws sounds in con-
tract, private relief follows the lead of tort damages; and public relief, the
law of crimes. The new federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO)65 has created a whole new species of statutory
fraud. This remedy has moved the focus of business fraud from tradi-
tional common law areas to federal law-thirty-seven percent of civil
RICO cases involve common law fraud in a commercial or business set-
ting, forty percent involve securities fraud, and only nine percent involve
allegations of organized crime activity.66 Recently, Justice Thurgood
Marshall questioned whether, in enacting RICO, Congress intended "to
federalize a great deal of state common law" which as a result has
"brought profound changes to our legal landscape."67
Another recent development is the "constitutionalization" of tradi-
60. Exodus, 22:5-6, 9.
61. For example, civil liability is assessed and fault presumed in actions arising under vari-
ous provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982) and the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
62. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
64. Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1984).
65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
66. See A.B.A., SECTION OF CORP., BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD
Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 55-56 (1985).
67. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3296 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting
in Sedima and American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, 105 S. Ct. 1291 (1985)).
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tional tort claims under state law, claims that allege violations of the
constitution or federal statutes by federal and state officials. Since the
Supreme Court approved such actions against federal officials in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,68 and-
under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 1983-against municipal, county and
state employees in Monroe v. Pape 6 9 and its progeny, a broad range of
actions have been introduced to the federal forum. Between 1961 and
1984, the number of claims ified in federal district court in a single year
under civil rights statutes rose from 296 to 21,219.70 These claims range
in subject matter from conversion of hobby materials to physical assaults
by state officials, a public defender's performance of his counsel duties,
harassment of a street vendor, failure of a social worker to foresee inju-
ries inflicted on foster children, failure of state officials to close flood
gates on a canal resulting in flood damage to property, failure of public
work officials to salt roads in winter causing an auto accident and delay
of public rescue services in responding to accidents.
71
An aspect of this extensive litigation has been the unfortunate use of
language that confuses claims of constitutional deprivation with claims
of mere tortious conduct. In almost a journalistic fashion, certain com-
mentators have described deprivation of constitutional rights as "consti-
tutional torts."7 2 More unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used this
expression in at least three opinions.7" Once the semantic floodgates
opened, the lower courts jumped on this very questionable expression
with the term "constitutional tort" appearing, according to our records,
in 710 opinions of courts of appeals and district courts.74
A deprivation of a constitutional right is suijuris; it is a denial of an
otherwise recognized property or liberty interest. It is a doctrine much
more sophisticated and global than a tort: The requirements to impose
liability differ in theory and practice from the imposition of tort liability.
It bears a kinship to tort, to be sure. But that kinship is probably limited
68. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
69. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
70. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 134.
71. Id.
72. Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State of Mind
Requirement, 46 U. CN. L. REv. 45 (1977); Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and
the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH.
L. REv. 5 (1980); Yudof, Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School
Off cial, 49 S. CAL. L. RPv. 1322 (1976).
73. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326
(1981); Monell v. New York City Dep't Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663-64 n.7 (1978).
74. Search for "Constitutional Tort," on LEXIS, Genfed Library, U.S. App. & Dist. files
(Feb. 25, 1986).
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less to liability than to the law of damages, including notions of proxi-
mate cause and the compensatory/punitive damages dichotomy.
Compensatory damages for breach of contract are familiar and are
used often in the federal courts where damages relate to contract law.
Here the law of damages seeks to place the aggrieved party in the eco-
nomic position he or she would have been in if the contract had been
performed.75 This involves an award of both the "losses caused and gains
prevented by the defendant's breach, in excess of savings made possible
... "76 Moreover, the federal courts have utilized remedies of specific
redress, implicating common (if not Biblical) law, equitable concepts of
replevin, specific performance and the relatively new remedy of declara-
tory judgment. These methods permit a federal court to order the return
of an object unjustly taken, compliance with a contract or a clarification
of responsibilities under an ongoing contract. These are unusual reme-
dies, but under proper circumstances they provide the courts with a
greater array of tools for doing justice between the parties when substi-
tuted redress is inadequate.
E. Punishing Those Who Wrong the Public
History has always allowed the house of the law to be remodeled
and altered. In the past, to use the classifications of Blackstone and Jus-
tinian, much of the civil law, perhaps ninety percent, consisted of the law
of persons, property and inheritance, and contract. But in recent times,
nuances of the law of persons have diminished in importance. Thus, the
limitations and rights of slaves that occupied much attention in Roman
law were old hat by the time of Blackstone; and the eighteenth century
English law of persons concentrated more on paternal power, virtually
eliminating all rights of the wife against the husband, the son against his
father and the infant ward against the guardian. But with the passage of
time, community standards change. And as these change, so does the
substance of the law. Thus in the surge for total equality in recent de-
cades by federal and state statute and by mighty extrusion of the equal
protection clause, older niceties of the law of persons seem to be of his-
torical interest only.7 7 In today's federal courts we do not encounter
75. U.C.C. § 1-106 (1976); 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); C. Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 56 (1935); 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1968).
76. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932).
77. See, eg., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982). See also Monell v. New
York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local government units not immune
from § 1983 suits); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(discussing whether board of education is immune from § 1983 suits); Attwood v. Estate of
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much litigation on the rules relating to the creation of property and suc-
cession rights, except perhaps the constitutional law cases dealing with
property of illegitimates7 ' and statutory and constitutional law decisions
dealing with women's rights.7 9 Rather, the bulk of federal litigation in-
volves contracts, the protection of personal rights to property and liberty
interests, torts (usually state law ushered into the courtroom through the
diversity door) and crimes. It is to the federal law of crimes that I now
turn.
There is a great gap in the penal law accounts of primitive jurispru-
dence. All civilized systems seemed to agree in drawing a distinction
between offenses against the community (state) and offenses against the
individual. Generally we distinguish between crimes (crimina) and
wrongs or torts (delicta). In the law of ancient communities the so-called
penal law was actually a law of torts. The injured person proceeded
against the wrongdoer by an ordinary civil action and, if successful, re-
covered compensation by money damages. As early as the Roman
Twelve Tables (450 B.C.), furtum or theft stood at the head of civil
wrongs recognized by Roman law."° Other civil wrongs included assault
and violent robbery, as well as trespass, libel and slander. Book IV of
The Institutes of Justinian defines as torts: "theft, robbery with violence
(rapina), wrongful infliction of damage or contumely."81 By the time of
the laws of the Germanic tribes, an immense system of money compensa-
tion was in force for all actions which we now consider crimes, including
homicide.
Under Anglo-Saxon law, a sum was placed on the life of every
free man, according to his rank, and a corresponding sum on
every wound that could be inflicted on his person, for nearly
every injury that could be done to his civil rights, honour or
peace; the sum being aggravated according to adventitious
circumstances.
8 2
Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982) (no intrafamily immunity for "willful or wan-
ton" conduct); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (abrogat-
ing spousal immunity); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. 1971) (no intrafamily
immunity for intentional torts); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971)
(abrogating spousal immunity).
78. See, e.g., Trinble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968).
79. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
80. J. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 350-51 (1976). See also J. THOMAS, supra
note 39, at 263.
81. INST. JuST. 4.4. See infra notes 109 & 110 and accompanying text.
82. R. KEMBLE, ANGLO-SAXONS 177. See H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 370.
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This is not to say, however, that in more ancient times the concept
of a wrong or injury to the state or collective community did not exist.
Indeed, there developed a procedure in Roman times, especially during
the decline of the Republic, by which the senate delegated certain of its
powers to particular Quaestores or commissions to investigate a particu-
lar accusation and, if it be proved, to punish the particular offender.
Gradually these ad hoe commissions became permanent, and by the time
of Emperor Augustus a rudimentary form of criminal jurisprudence had
been established.
Although I have no empirical data to support this proposition, I
advance the theory that the movement from private compensation to
public punishment probably followed a change in economics. So long as
there was a society of freeholders, or solvent defendants, private compen-
sation to the victim was a satisfactory solution to the wrong. But with
immigration and population growth, and an increase in the number of
judgment-proof members of society, an alternative to private compensa-
tion became necessary. Simultaneously, no doubt, the notion developed
that it was the business of the collective community to avenge its own
wrongs by its own hand. Thus came into being the doctrine that the
punishment of crimes belonged in a special manner to the sovereign as
representative and mandatory of his people. Once this authority was es-
tablished in the Roman sovereign, with all the attendant prestige, the
notion was easily transplanted to other societies.
But in the earliest civilizations, private penalties were assessed
against those who wronged society in special areas that were most impor-
tant to its continued existence. Thus, in addition to capital punishment
for a number of offenses, including striking one's mother or father, early
punishments were based on the system of "[e]ye for eye, tooth for tooth,
hand for hand, foot for foot. Burning for burning, wound for wound,
stripe for stripe." 3 Other crimes involved offenses to property, agricul-
ture and marriage. As societies became increasingly complex, the crimi-
nal law was extended to areas that had become important to them. In
many instances the criminal law began to include offenses of which an-
cient civilizations never could have conceived, such as economic crimes
with which we are evidencing increasing concern and crimes pertaining
to government reporting requirements.
Federal criminal law serves a number of specific functions in our
present-day federal-state system. To be sure, it performs some of the
usual tasks of any law enforcement system, such as protecting the institu-
83. Exodus 21:24-25.
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tions and operations of the federal government against criminal activity.
But notwithstanding grandstanding activity by many members of Con-
gress, it must be emphasized that federal authorities do not have the ba-
sic responsibility of day-to-day maintenance of order in society. That
responsibility is the province of local, not federal, law enforcement. Fed-
eral law enforcement is designed only to supplement local authorities in
the performance of that basic responsibility. Thus, it must be understood
that federal law is not limited to conduct that poses a threat to federal
institutions or operations. Moreover, the same conduct, to one extent or
another, is also the subject of both state and federal sanctions. Professor
Louis B. Schwartz has described federal law enforcement as federal aux-
iliary criminal jurisdiction-auxiliary, that is, to state law enforcement.
s4
Historically, there has been a steady growth in federal auxiliary
criminal jurisdiction. Some of it has been sparked by dramatic criminal
events-the Lindberg baby kidnapping and the Dillinger spree of bank
robberies come to mind-but most of it has resulted from congressional
activity after extensive widely-publicized hearings, especially in the era of
radio and television. Facts adduced at these hearings have often demon-
strated either failure or corruption in local law enforcement. The Mail
Fraud Statute was first enacted in 1889,"5 the Mann Act in 1910,6 the
Dyer Act, which deals with interstate transportation of stolen vehicles, in
1919.17 Shortly thereafter came the kidnapping provision in 1932"s and
the federal prohibition against bank robbery of a federally-insured bank
in 1934.89 New anti-gambling laws were enacted in 196190 and in 1964.91
But many prosecutions are now being brought under relatively new
statutes-the Controlled Substance Act of 1970,92 the Hobbs Act93 and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
94
Moreover, a favorite device of federal agents is prosecution under the
recent Conspiracy Statute.95
The number of federal prosecutions continues to rise, from 27,910
84. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, in LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 64 (1948).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
86. Id. § 2421.
87. Id. § 2312.
88. Id. § 1201.
89. Id. § 2113.
90. Id. §§ 1081, 1953.
91. Id. § 224.
92. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
94. Id. §§ 1961-1968.
95. Id. § 371.
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major offenses in 1980 to 35,911 in 1984, with the largest number of
offenses being drug abuse; various types of fraud, including income tax,
postal and false claims and statements; larceny of United States property;
forgery; and bank robbery.96
One of the serious problems in federal criminal law is the allocation
of prosecution between local and federal authorities. Clearly, matters
that are traditionally within state law enforcement should remain there-
homicide, theft, assault, fraud and sex offenses. Federal law should be
limited to cases in which there is a special justification for federal
assistance.
At the present time, Congress has utilized a plethora of techniques
upon which to base federal jurisdiction:
(1) use of the mails; (2) use of means of interstate com-
merce; (3) "affecting" commerce; (4) interstate transportation
(a) of the victim, (b) of the proceeds, (c) of the criminal himself,
(4) radio broadcasting; (5) status of the offender as a Federal
employee; (6) status of the offender as an employee of an inter-
state carrier; (7) use of facilities of national security exchanges;
(8) federal ownership or custody of the property; (9) ownership
or custody of the property by institutions licensed by the fed-
eral government or under its protection. The list can, of
course, be extended almost indefinitely with crimes resting on
the tax, war, and other powers of Congress.97
Undoubtedly, in the future, the criminal law will continue to ex-
pand, coming to apply to areas of conduct that may seem surprising to us
today. As society becomes more complex--economically, scientifically
and industrially-the criminal law may become a necessary tool for the
allocation of scarce resources.
III. THE SUPEREMINENT PRINCIPLES IN HISTORY
It is possible, I am sure, to conjure up certain aspects of federal law
which do not neatly fit within the specifics of the five supereminent prin-
ciples that compose our house of the law. Federal taxation, for example,
may come within a fuzzy area. But even here, I believe that most tax
litigation centers on regulations governing income from use, sale or
purchase of property, or employment contract income. Whether it can
be argued that these principles are all-inclusive is not absolutely critical
to my basic thesis. This thesis, I must emphasize, is that it is necessary to
96. 1984 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 54, at Table D-2.
97. Schwartz, supra note 84, at 79.
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clarify and simplify the law-in both lawyers' briefs and judges' opin-
ions-because too many current offerings give an appearance of substan-
tive law much more complicated and eccentric than it is in fact. I believe
that the structure of court opinions will be more professional, briefs more
clear and the outlines of the house of the law cleaner and more distinct if
wholesale dependence on citations gives way to a reference to the rele-
vant primary discipline of the law, to a relation back to fundamentals
and to the reasons why these fundamentals exist in the first place.
This reference back to fundamentals brings into focus the second
characteristics of the supereminent principles. Beyond their predomi-
nance in today's federal litigation, these principles boast a formidable an-
cestral chain and impressive relationship to legal systems of bygone eras.
A brief examination of their role in those systems helps to explain why
they loom as the dominating principles of the modem era. I offer a ca-
veat at the outset of this excursion into legal traditions past: I do not
represent that the treatment of the various legal systems is in any way
exhaustive or complete. In fact, I represent the precise opposite. My
survey is intended to be cursory and generalized. This is so because I
endeavor this historical exercise for the limited purpose of demonstrating
my central theme: Our law rests on fundamental bedrock concepts com-
mon to most, if not all, of the legal systems societies have created.
These five principles have their roots in formidable legal systems of
past societies. Historically, four of these-creating and protecting prop-
erty rights, fulfilling promises, redressing losses caused by breach or fault
and punishing those who wrong the public--can be identified in all re-
corded societies possessing a social order. The fifth-creating and pro-
tecting a liberty interest-has certainly been with us at least since Roman
times. A quick glance at the written laws that have governed principal
societies in the ancient and modem worlds is illuminating. Regardless of
the variations of time and geography, and vicissitudes of incidents and
circumstances in particular empires, kingdoms, republics or fiefdoms,
considerable resemblances are seen. The ends of law-preserving the
public peace, just dispute settlements, maintaining a comfortable social
and physical environment, reasonable security of expectations, tolerable
adjustment of conflicting social interest and channeling of a social
change-have been advanced by different means. Hence a variation of
means does exist, but the ends seem to have remained the same. Perhaps
more accurately stated, fundamental legal concepts remained the same
but their definitions changed as community values changed.
According to Montesquieu, each people or nation develops over a
period of time an individual genius or general character, what he called a
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"general spirit."98 This "general spirit" is the product of multiple causes:
Men are influenced by various causes, by the climate, reli-
gion, laws, the maxims of government, by precedents, morals
and customs; from whence is formed a general spirit that takes
its rise from these.
In proportion, as in every nation any one of these causes
acts with more force, the others in the same degree become
weak. Nature and the climate rule almost alone over the
savages; customs govern the Chinese; the laws tyrannize in Ja-
pan; morals had formerly all their influence in Sparta; maxims
of government, and the ancient simplicity of manners, once pre-
vailed in Rome.99
A. The Institutes of Justinian
In my view, the Anglo-American legal tradition begins with the pro-
mulgation of The Institutes of Emporor Justinian on November 21, 533
A.D. An attempt at a contemporary codification of Roman law as it had
developed for some 1000 years, The Institute range from eloquent ab-
stractions to very precise statements of legal consequences that followed
detailed facts. Thus, Justinian's introduction reminds us that "[j]ustice is
the constant and perpetual desire to give to each man his due right,"''
and that the precepts of the law are "to live justly, not to injure another
and to render to each his own."'
The Institutes were divided into four discrete books. Book I, dealing
with rights of the person, described rights of freed men and slaves, out-
lined paternal power and family rights, and set forth the law of marriage,
adoptions and guardianships. Book II, concerning the law of things, de-
scribed both corporeal and incorporeal rights, including ownership and
possession of real property and chattels as well as usufructs, and set forth
the law of wills, gifts and transfers. Book III described intricacies of
intestacy and gave us the first details of the law of obligation of contracts.
Book IV described the Roman law of torts.
Henry Sumner Maine has written that "[n]either Ancient law nor
any other source of evidence discloses to us society entirely destitute of
The Conception of Contract," 10 2 yet it is apparent that Roman law was
the first jurisprudence to raise the enforcement of promises to the legal
98. 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 363; xix, iv (1748).
99. Id.
100. INST. JUST. 1.1.
101. INST. JUST. 1.1.3.
102. H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 303.
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dignity it enjoys today. Originally, that with which the law armed its
sanctions was not a naked promise, but a promise accompanied by a sol-
emn ceremonial. As the Roman jurisprudence of obligation developed,
one or two steps in the ceremonial were dispensed with first; then others
were simplified or permitted to be omitted on certain conditions; finally,
a few specific contracts were separated from the rest and allowed to be
entered into without ceremonial form. The selection of these types were
influenced by the activity and energy of social and commercial inter-
course. Slowly the agreement itself, the mental engagement, isolated it-
self from technicalities and became the major ingredient of legal inquiry.
Among Rome's greatest contributions to the law was its exposition
of the law of obligations. Over the decades, if not centuries, it developed
four types of contract-the Verbal, the Literal, the Real and the Consen-
sual. Each class was named for certain formalities which were required
over and above the mere agreement of the contracting parties.
As can be expected, the earliest form was the Verbal, and the cere-
mony required was the stipulation of the parties: a question addressed by
the person who exacted the promise and the answer given by the person
who made it. It was the promisee who, in the character of stipulation,
put all the terms of the contract into the form of a question, and the
answer was given by the promisor: "Do you promise that you will de-
liver to me such and such a stove, at such and such a place, on such and
such a day?" "I do so promise."
The Literal contract was one evidenced by a particular writing, a
business book entry showing an entry on the debit side of a ledger. To
understand this is to understand that in Roman households every single
item of domestic receipt and expenditure had to be entered into appropri-
ate books and periodically transferred to a general household ledger.
The Real Contract departed in theory from the ceremonial aspects
of the stipulation of the Verbal Contract and the debit entry on the ledger
of the Literal. Here, what triggered the obligation was the delivery of the
specific thing that was the subject of the agreement. Performance on one
side was allowed to impose a legal duty on the other. Roman jurists,
according to Hugo Grotius, referred to three reciprocal acts: "I give that
you may give; I do that you may do; I do that you may give."1
10 3
The most interesting, and probably the most important, of the obli-
gation classes was the Consensual Contract, which was used in four spec-
ified types of agreements: sale, partnership, agency and hiring. The title
"Consensual" derives not so much from consent of the parties but rather
103. 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 343-44.
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from the consensus or mutual assent of the parties."°
Book III of Justinian describes these "four species" of contract and
treats each category separately and in great detail.0 5 It also treats quasi-
contractual obligations, "obligations which, properly speaking, cannot be
said to arise from contract but which, since they do not derive their exist-
ence from delict, are treated as arising quasi-contractually." 106 Perhaps
it is in Justinian that we see the seeds of the controversy that has plagued
us down through the centuries-the confusion between implied contracts
in which acts and circumstances are symbols of the same ingredients
which are manifested by words in an express contract and quasi-
contracts which are not contracts at all.'
0 7
Book IV contained the Roman law of torts or delicti, defined as a
"wrongful act, not deriving from agreement, which causes damage to an-
other for which the latter may recover a penalty from the wrongdoer."'
08
These torts were sins of commission only, and not of omission. Named
as specific torts were theft, robbery with violence and wrongful infliction
of damage or "contumely." 109 "Contumely" was any deliberate affront
to another, whether by conduct or by words. It served as the residual
tort for wrongs against the personality of another with almost unlimited
scope, including assault and battery, defamation, imputations upon a wo-
man's chastity and trespass on another's land.1'0 A tort also was made
104. See H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 327-28:
The extreme importance of this history of Contract, as a safeguard against al-
most innumerable delusions,. . . gives a complete account of the march of ideas from
one great landmark ofjurisprudence to another. We begin with the Nexum, in which
a Contract and a Conveyance are blended, and in which the formalities which ac-
company the agreement are even more important than the agreement itself. From
the Nexum we pass to the Stipulation, which is a simplified form of the older ceremo-
nial. The Literal Contract comes next, and here all formalities are waived, if proof of
the agreement can be supplied by the rigid observances of a Roman household. In
the Real Contract a moral duty is for the first time recognized, and persons who have
joined or acquiesced in the partial performance of an engagement are forbidden to
repudiate it on account of defects in form. Lastly, the Consensual Contracts emerge,
in which the mental attitude of the contractors is solely regarded, and external cir-
cumstances have no title to notice except as evidence of the inward undertaking. It is
of course uncertain how far this progress of Roman ideas from a gross of refined
conception exemplifies the necessary progress of human thought on the subject of
Contract. The Contract law of all other ancient societies but the Roman is either too
scanty to furnish information, or else is entirely lost; and modern jurisprudence is so
thoroughly leavened with the Roman notions that it furnishes us with no contrasts or
parallels from which instruction can be gleaned.
105. INST. JusT. 3.13.2.
106. Id. at 3.27.
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 comment b (1981) (Quasi-contracts
"are obligations created by law for reasons of justice.").
108. J. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 262.
109. INST. JUST. 4.4.
110. Id. at 4.4.1-.12.
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out if one sought payment of a debt from a surety which the principal
debtor both could and was willing to pay.
Tort redress in Roman law was originally private revenge-actual
retaliation by the victim, putting the body of the wrongdoer at the mercy
of his victim. The law then developed to permit buying off vengeance by
agreement of the parties in a suitable alternative (substituted) redress.
Finally, the law came to require a monetary penalty as the primary rem-
edy in all circumstances, whether the quantum was fixed absolutely or to
be assessed by the judge in a legal action.11
The beauty of the Justinian Institutes is its clarity, as well as its or-
der. It is important today as a constant reminder that many legal con-
cepts currently in use in federal courts also were in use in a civilized
society more than 1000 years ago. The Institutes can be regarded as the
cornerstone of our supereminent principle of liberty; thus, the opening
first words of Book I:
Justice is the constant and perpetual desire to give to each man
his due right.
3. These are the precepts of law: to live justly, not to injure
another and to render each his own.
112
And as we have previously indicated, from The Institutes we derive our
basic definition of liberty:
Liberty, from which the expression free men is derived, is the
natural ability to do anything one pleases unless it be prohibited
by force or law.'"
3
B. Blackstone and the Law of England
The most popular exposition of our fundamentals, however, took
place in England in the four years between 1765 and 1769 when William
Blackstone published his Commentaries. According to Lord Denning,
Blackstone "was the greatest exponent of the common law that we have
ever had."''14 While the Emperor Justinian announced his promulgation
after ten centuries of Roman law experience, Blackstone's efforts came
seven centuries after the Battle of Hastings in 1066, the date usually asso-
ciated with the birth of common law. Obviously influenced by Justinian,
Blackstone too utilized four books, but his compilation did not precisely
111. J. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 262-63.
112. INST. JUST. 1.1.1-.3.
113. Id. at 1.3.1; see supra note 39.
114. A. DENNING, WHAT NEXT IN THE LAW 13 (1982).
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track The Institutes. He assembled substantive qualities of rights and
wrongs, private and public concerns, and persons and property to give us
a symmetrical and durable statement of common law. Even the briefest
summary discloses the relationship between four of our five supereminent
principles, the law of contracts being essentially ignored.
Blackstone's Book I, The Rights of Persons, details most of the
ground covered by Justinian, with one major exception-he has virtually
nothing to say about slavery, a subject that occupied so much of the Ro-
man law of persons and property. Students of contract law seem un-
happy that Blackstone relegated contracts to a relatively insignificant
portion of The Rights of Persons. They contend that Blackstone did not
respect the specificity that this discipline, so amply covered by Justinian,
demands. Book II, The Rights of Things, bears a close resemblance to
Justinian's Book II. It describes the law of property in thirty-two chap-
ters, twenty-two of them dealing with real property.
Book III, Of Private Wrongs, summarizes the law of torts, but this
book treats procedure more than it does the substantive law. In recalling
the society of Blackstone's day, Professor Thomas G. Barnes, of the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, offers an explanation for this phenome-
non. Professor Barnes reminds us that Georgian England was an "age of
fast horses, careening carriages, drunken foul mouths, atrocious fires, a
gutter-press, considerable unrest in growing towns and declining coun-
trysides, bad food and worse drink,... lighted squibs, of quacks, frauds,
whores, and monte banks-in short an age well-supplied with
tortfeasors."' ' 5 We must also remember that Blackstone's books were
taken from these lectures, and that those who paid to attend these lec-
tures and subsequently use his materials had an immediate practical in-
terest in how to claim against or defend tortfeasors. Blackstone's final
Book IV, Of Public Wrongs, is a treatise on criminal law, dealing with an
analysis of common law definitions.' 16
A vital part of English law that was centuries-old at the time of
Blackstone was the profound commitment of the English to individual
liberty. Blackstone stated:
[T]rial by jury ever has been, and I trust every will be, looked
upon as the glory of the English law.... [I]t is the most tran-
115. Barnes, Introduction to W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENG-
LAND at 21 (1983).
116. That Book IV was not simply contemporary journalism is indicated by the author's
experiences when he practiced as a Pennsylvania lawyer in the forties and fifties and as a state
judge in the sixties. At that time, many common law definitions of crimes still constituted the
law of Pennsylvania.
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scendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for,
that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or
his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his
neighbors and equals.117
Although sometimes said to be a charter of liberties only for a small
baronage, the Magna Carta, signed by King John at Runnymede on June
15, 1215, was subsequently so frequently reissued and confirmed that the
Great Charter must be considered the source of liberties under law of all
English and American freemen. Because the Magna Carta is more often
cited than read, the magical Clause 39 deserves to be set forth:
No Free-man's body shall be taken, nor imprisoned, nor dis-
seised, nor outlawed, nor banished, nor in any way be damaged,
nor shall the King send him to prison by force, excepting by the
judgement of his Peers and by the Law of the land.11
It is upon this clause that our own sense of liberty, expressed or implied
in the Constitution, is anchored. It served as the philosophical base of
the 1628 Petition of Right and the 1689 Bill of Rights. 119 Moreover,
contemporary due process language appeared as early as 1368, when-to
prevent abuses by false accusers-Edward III decreed that: "[N]o man
be drawn to answer without presentment before justices, or matter of
record, or by due process and original writ, according to the ancient law
of the land."12
The constitutional significance of Magna Carta is immense. Bryce
measured it in profound terms:
The Charter of 1215 was the starting point of the constitutional
117. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379.
118. MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39. See R. THOMSON, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE MAGNA
CHARTA OF KING JOHN 55 (1829).
119. A young barrister named John Somers drew up a Declaration of Rights for presenta-
tion to the new King William who followed King James III. This Declaration became the Bill
of Rights of 1689. Macaulay describes the importance of the English Bill of Rights:
The Declaration of Right, though it made nothing law which had not been law
before, contained the germ of the law which gave religious freedom to the Dissenter,
of the law which secured the independence of the Judges, of the law which limited
the duration of Parliaments, of the law which placed the liberty of the press under
the protection of juries, of the law which prohibited the slave trade, of the law which
abolished the sacramental test, of the law which relieved the Roman Catholics from
civil disabilities, of the law which reformed the representative system, of every good
law which has been passed during more than a century and a half, of every good law
which may hereafter, in the course of ages, be found necessary to promote the public
weal, and to satisfy the demands of public opinion.
3 T. MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE SECOND
1311 (1914).
120. 42 Edward III c.3 (T. Barnes trans. 1983). See Barnes, Introduction to MAGNA
CARTA at 6 (1983).
May 1986]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:755
history of the English race, the first link in a long chain of con-
stitutional instruments which have moulded men's minds and
held together free governments not only in England, but wher-
ever the English race has gone and the English tongue is
spoken. 121
Rudyard Kipling has expressed a similar feeling:
And still, when mob or monarch lays
Too rude a hand on English ways,
A whisper wakes, the shudder plays
Across the reeds at Runnymede.
122
C. Hebrew Law
Yet there are laws even more ancient than Magna Carta that con-
tain clear resemblances to our present legal system. Ancient Jewish law,
for example, is recorded in the first five books of the Bible, the Penta-
teuch. Interpretation and application of this law over early generations
developed a rich oral tradition, culminating in a body of writings known
as the Talmud. Generally, the Talmud is a set of books consisting of the
Mishna, which contains originally oral law supplementing scriptural law,
and the Gemara, a collection of commentaries on and interpretation of
the Mishna. Notwithstanding this extensive source, we need look no fur-
ther than the Pentateuch itself to establish the prevalent existence of the
five supereminent principles.
To begin with, biblical law governed the succession and characteris-
tics of real and personal property, recognizing the doctrine of primogeni-
ture.123 The eldest male parent appeared to be supreme in his household.
The flocks and herds of the children were the flocks and herds of that
parent, which he apparently held in a representative, rather than proprie-
tary, character. This property was equally divided at the father's death
among his descendants in the first degree. Although the eldest son some-
times received a double share, he was more generally endowed with no
hereditary advantage beyond an honorary precedence.
121. A. DENNING, THE FAMILY STORY 231 (1981) (quoting Lord Bryce).
122. Id. (quoting Rudyard Kipling). Sir Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of England,
remarked on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the Magna Carta:
Upon this chapter, as out of a roote, many fruitful branches of the Law of England
have sprung .... As the gold-finer will not out of the dust, threds, or shreds of gold
let passe the least crum, in respect of the excellency of the metal: so ought not the
learned reader to let passe any syllable of this law, in respect of the excellency of the
matter.
Id. (quoting Sir Edward Coke).
123. Genesis 38:7-:11.
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Biblical law further sought to protect the most basic liberty interests
of an individual to be free from physical assault and battery. Victims of
assault and battery were entitled to compensation for all harm caused,
including the amount expended to be cured."2 4
The law of the Hebrews also regulated promises that established a
debtor-creditor relationship. For example, the imposition of an usurious
interest rate was proscribed if the debtor was poor,12 but the practice
was expressly allowed if the borrower was not Hebrew. 12 6 The law also
required that a lender who took as security for a loan the borrower's
raiment return this collateral by sundown so "that he may sleep in his
own raiment."'
12 7
Hebrew law embodied as well familiar notions regarding the redress
of losses occasioned by fault. In this respect theft was viewed largely as a
civil offense, with emphasis placed upon compensation of the victim.
One who stole and killed an ox was required to restore to the victim five
times the value of the ox.1 28 In this context, the recovery of triple dam-
ages under the Sherman Antitrust Act129 is not a new concept. Princi-
ples of negligence also were evident in Hebrew law. For example, if
injury resulted from an animal falling into an open pit, liability attached
to the person responsible for the pit.130
Finally, while the focus of early Jewish law was to compensate the
victim of wrongs, some wrongs were deemed such serious crimes against
society as to be punishable by death. These included murder,"' striking
one's mother or father,1 32 cursing one's mother or father, 133 and
kidnapping.
134
D. Hindu Law
The Hindu Institutes, or ordinances of Menu, supposed to have been
a body of written law, was translated in 1792 by Sir William Jones.
135
Because its history is fragmented and lacks much recordation, the Code
124. Exodus 21:18-:19.
125. Id. at 22:25.
126. Deuteronomy 23:20.
127. Id. at 24:10-:13. See also Exodus 22:26-:27.
128. Exodus 22:1.
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
130. Exodus 21:33-:34.
131. Id. at 21:12.
132. Id. at 21:15.
133. Id. at 21:17.
134. Id. at 21:16; Deuteronomy 24:7.
135. W. JONES, ESSAY ON THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE HINDUS (1792), referenced in B.
Barrett, Introductory Discourse to THE CODE NAPOLEON at xx (1811).
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of Menu has been described "as a whole of suspicious authenticity" and
has been questioned by Professor Thomas G. Barnes. 136 Yet for our lim-
ited purposes it is instructive. These laws governed a society (variously
1280 B.C.-880 B.C.) that was the direct antithesis of that described by
ringing phrases of our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these
truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." '137
Early Hindu society did not embrace the notion that "all men are
created equal." According to them, all men were born into four social
classes: the highest and the priestly elite were Brahmens; then followed a
military caste, Cshatiya; the farming or mercantile, Vaisya; and the ser-
vant class, Sudra. The legal code regulated paternal power, education,
marriage, divorce, guardianship, poverty rights, inheritance, debt, inter-
est, usury, pledge, suretyship, deposit, contracts, sale and promiscuous
wrongs.138 It provided for the adjudication of controversies with a law of
evidence and examination of witnesses. Although the administration of
justice was committed to the sovereign, if he could not attend to it, he
might commit it to others. A court session was opened by doing rever-
ence to the deities, and the cry "Beware 0 Judge, lest justice being over-
turned, overturn both us and thyself." '13 9
As in other ancient societies, a focal point of recorded law dealt with
succession to real property. Hindu law was particularly refined in this
respect, distinguishing between, for example, twelve different classifica-
tions of sons for purposes of inheritance."4 But one aspect of the Hindu
law of property ran counter to the Western presumption of single prop-
erty ownership, in which we generally follow the Roman maxim: "No
one can be kept in co-proprietorship against his will" (nemo in commu-
nione potest invitus detineri). This concept was reversed in Hindu law,
because the norm was the village patriarchal society and an assembly of
136. See H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 122. See also T. Barnes, Introduction to THE CODE
NAPOLEON at 32 (1983). Barnes has written that Barrett's Introductory Discourse, supra note
135, "besides containing a considerable amount of discrete information, much of which subse-
quent scholarship has doubtless proven wrong, has the value of any period piece." Id.
137. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). In Jefferson's first drafting of this para-
graph, this statement was phrased as follows: "We hold these truths to be sacred and undenia-
ble; that all men are created equal and independent; that from that equal creation they derive
in rights inherent and alienable, among which are the preservation of life, and liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness." SOCIAL SCIENCE DEP'T, UNIV. OF CHICAGO, THE PEOPLE SHALL
JUDGE 201 (1949).
138. B. Barrett, supra note 135, at xx-xxvii.
139. Id. at xxxix.
140. Id. at xxxv.
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co-proprietors. The result seems to have been a form of property owner-
ship that I find in some respects similar to New York City's law of apart-
ment cooperatives. The Hindu system also provided for inheritances. As
soon as a son was born he acquired a vested interest in his father's sub-
stance, which generally remained undivided for several generations."'
E. Chinese Law
Chinese law, as reflected in the laws and statutes of the Dynasty of
Ching (1644), Ta Ching Lu Li, drew heavily upon principles espoused in
the Chou King, the book compiled by Confucius in the sixth century
B.C.142 This law provided for disposition of real property by sale and
exchange and also governed land mortgages.
Apparently, the law of descent was governed by customary law and
not by statutes. More recent (yet pre-communist) Chinese law empha-
sized the family as a unit. The father had control over his sons, his
grandsons and their wives. Unlike our modern law, which constantly
refines rights of various family members, Chinese municipal (or positive)
law did not
greatly concern itself with what takes place within the domestic
forum or family group; the head had certain discretionary pow-
ers, and unless these powers are grossly abused it will not inter-
fere. In the Father is vested all family property, and he alone
can dispose of it. At his death his eldest son takes his place and
the family goes on as before. 43
But by the time of the Ching Empire, family property was often
141. The popular notion is that the Village landholders are all descended from one or
more individuals who settled the Village; and that the only exceptions are formed by
persons who have derived their rights by purchase or otherwise from members of the
original stock. The supposition is confirmed by the fact that, to this day [19th cen-
tury], there are only single families of landholders in small villages and not many in
large ones; but each has branched out into so many members that it is not uncom-
mon for the whole agricultural labour to be done by the landholders, without the aid
either of tenants or of labourers. The rights of the landholders are theirs collectively,
and, though they almost always have a more or less perfect partition of them, they
never have any entire separation. A landholder, for instance, can sell or mortgage his
rights; but he must first have the consent of the Village, and the purchaser steps
exactly into his place and takes up all his obligations. If a family becomes extinct, its
share returns to the common stock.
M. ELPHINSTONE, HISTORY OF INDIA 76 (1905), quoted in H. MAINE, supra note 1, at 263-64.
142. See generally B. Barrett, supra note 135, at xlviii; G. JAMIESON, CHINESE FAMILY
AND COMMERCIAL LAW (1970); G. STAUNTON, TA TSING LEU LEE (1810); C.K. YANG, A
CHINESE VILLAGE IN EARLY COMMUNIST TRADITION (1959); K. YANG, THE CHINESE
FAMILY IN THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION (1959); Freedman, The Family in China, Past and
Present, 34 PAC. AFF. 323 (1961-62).
143. G. JAMIESON, supra note 142, at 2-3.
May 1986]
792 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:755
collectively owned. It was often legally regulated in the form of corpo-
rate ownership under the direction and control of the head of the house,
and could not be disposed of without the father's consent or until the
father's death. Alternatively, alienation could be effected only by the
common consent of all sons. Female descendants had no claim on family
property. Thus, hereditary official rank descended upon the eldest son
and his descendants, but title to all family property, real or personal,
apparently vested in the registered family collective or among all male
children. 144
Legal remedies took the form of corporal punishment. One who
unlawfully appointed and announced an heir and representative was sub-
ject to corporal punishment in the form of eighty blows. A trustee or
depository was liable for all property entrusted to him; sanctions were
imposed for breach of trust in the form of up to 100 blows and three
years banishment. The trustee was obligated to restore the entire value
of property loss, unless the loss occurred because of fire, water, theft or
the sickness or death of entrusted livestock. Interest could be imposed in
credit transactions, as much as thirty percent per year. Default resulted
in ten to fifty blows, depending upon the lateness of the payment and the
amount due. 145
Medical malpractice is not a twentieth century American phenome-
non, for Chinese law respected a related rule. If a patient died while
under the treatment of a physician, and a group of doctors concluded
that the death resulted through error or accident, the physician had to
pay a fine for the homicide and was forced to quit the profession but was
exempt from capital punishment.141
F. The Law of Classical Greece
Classical Greek society, notably that of Athens, produced the code
known as the Laws of Solon. As complex as the society it attempted to
regulate, the code encompassed fundamental categories of law. It con-
tained explicit provisions on how a person could control private prop-
erty. Aristotle said "the definition of ownership . . . is to have within
one's power the right of alienation." 47 Plutarch records that the right to
make wills was granted to the citizens by Solon, adding "'[h]e made
every man the master of his own property with full ownership.' ,148
144. Id. at 16-17.
145. Id.
146. B. Barrett, supra note 135, at lxxvi.
147. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I.v. (H. Tredennick trans. 1958)
148. 2 H. GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 265 (quoting Plutarch). Grotius cites as examples of
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Mortgages were provided with interest ranging from twelve to eighteen
percent.
The Laws of Solon also included rudimentary forms of our trespass
to property actions. This should not be surprising, as Athens was an
agricultural society and the wealth of many of its leading citizens was
measured in terms of land holdings. An early nineteenth century com-
mentator observed: "Solon seems to have been particularly attentive to
the boundaries and security of each man's property, for the prevention of
dispute and mischief, and those little contests so frequently occurring
from too near a neighbourhood."' 49 Bearing a close resemblence to mod-
em easements for air and light, no wall could be built within one foot of a
neighbor's ground, and olive trees had to be planted ten feet from the
boundary so that neither the root nor the branching would be an injury
to the land of another.
Although Athens engaged in trade with other nations, very little of
its law pertained primarily to commercial contracts. Rather, contract
law was significant primarily for the marriage relation, which served to
protect the stability of society in general and the transmission of individ-
ual wealth and family honor in particular. Marriage was essentially a
contract between the families of the marriage partners, and could only be
contracted between free citizens. The law of divorce required the di-
vorced husband to return the marriage dowry.
The criminal law was a valuable instrument by which Athens' rulers
could control the tone of society and promote what they considered to be
useful social ideals. Far more than punishing wrongs, the criminal law
was used to stifle social dissent. For example, criminal defamation suits
were permitted not only against living persons, but against dead persons
as well. Whoever was convicted of idleness three times was declared in-
famous and subject to the penalties attached to infamy. This law ensured
that everyone, particularly slaves and members of the lower classes, bore
his share of the burden of making Athens the preeminent city-state of its
time. Finally, because the sanctity of marriage was deemed crucial to
societal order, an adulteress might be punished with death by the of-
fended husband.
G. The Visigothic Code
The law of the barbarians, the dark era of the law, shared many
ancient wills: "You will find in Sophocles, Trachiniae [lines 1191 ff.], the will of Heracles; in
Euripides [Alcestis, lines 280 if.], that of Alcestis, and in Homer, Odyssey, XVII [lines 79 if.], a
donation by Telemachus in case of his death, and this is itself a sort of will." Id. at 265 n.1.
149. B. Barrett, supra note 135, at cx-cxi.
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characteristics of modem law and is easily classifiable within our five
categories. By "barbarians" I mean the loosely organized Indo-germanic
tribes which inhabited northern Europe after the decline of the Roman
Empire, consisting of the Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Lombards, Burgundi-
ans, Thuringians, Bavarians and other lesser groups. The Visigothic
Code, written in approximately 650 A.D., represents the most sophisti-
cated of these legal systems.
As did all the older systems, the Visigothic Code had a well devel-
oped set of inheritance and intestacy laws. Because of the German
"spirit of equality," the laws were generally not very intricate. Yet be-
cause of the society's military emphasis, special provisions regulated land
taken in battle, which could not descend to a female. Slaves composed
part of the disposable property of their masters, and even marriage had
certain property aspects, with "guardianship" of the wife passing to the
husband's family after payment of a negotiated nuptial price.
The Visigothic Code did not specifically enumerate liberty interests.
However, the Code's "aim" was "to provide the highest degree of safety
for both prince and people."1 50 All were subject to the laws, even the
King. The Code also provided a primitive framework of due process re-
quirements, such as access to a court before a duly appointed judge and
the power to appoint an attorney.
The Code contained extensive provisions concerning the enforce-
ment of business promises, particularly those involving the transfer of
land. Its law of sales contained a fairly well-developed requirement of
formality, requiring a written agreement to be drawn up by a notary and
witnessed by as many as twelve witnesses, depending on the value of the
article sold. This reflects, of course, the influence of Roman law's use of
ceremony as an ingredient of contract jurisprudence. Defective chattels
could be returned, and a vendor of land was required to either defend a
purchaser from eviction or give him lands of equal value. Once a bargain
was struck and earnest money delivered, the vendor could not back out.
The Visigothic Code contained elaborate listings of substituted re-
dress, termed "compositions," for every offense which occurred to the
drafters' imaginations as possible to be committed by one man against
another. 151 In this regard, the Code drafters' objective was to eliminate
the socially requisite revenge and the perpetual enmities caused
thereby.1 52 If the offender had insufficient funds, recourse would be had
to his personal property. Enumerated wrongs ranged from defamation,
150. S. ScoTr, THE VISIGOTHIC CODE 5 (1910).
151. B. Barrett, supra note 135, at ccxxxiii.
152. Id.
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with a schedule of fines for the various subjects defamed, to violation of
corpses, murder and wrongful death, with a schedule of recompense de-
pending on the social rank of the victim. For offenses which engendered
animosity, the Code prescribed payment of an additional amount called a
"faida," which was analogous to punitive damages. Refusal to pay this
amount entitled the person injured to kill the offender.
Notwithstanding the private redress of wrongs, offenses against the
sovereign-treason, cowardice and desertion-were considered public
acts and punishable by death. Some civil wrongs, such as murder, were
also punished by death if the perpetrator could not pay the composition.
Further, civil violations sometimes carried an additional fine, called a
"fredum," to be paid to the prince or chief due to the prejudice caused by
the criminal's acts to the society at large. This fine, a quasi-criminal pun-
ishment, would either be specified in the codes for the particular wrong,
or would be a set proportion of the composition.
H. Summary
Thus, the five supereminent pillars that support the house of the law
are clearly not new. They all boast a rich and prodigious history. Prop-
erty interests and corresponding rights, however created and protected,
can be traced to every society, even the most ancient. Liberty interests
have been coextensive with the aspirations of a given civilization, often
depending upon citizenship, religious affinity and ancestral caste.
Notwithstanding the hiatus in Medieval England, a formal obligation to
fulfill promises and a procedure to enforce this obligation has been part
of the law sired by ancient Rome. Even the most ancient codes allowed
private redress for the breach of an agreement or to compensate for an
injury caused by the fault of another. As societies became more sophisti-
cated, punishment by the sovereign was provided for those who wronged
the public weal, with penalties taking the form of corporal punishment,
banishment or death in place of earlier provisions that called for private
redress in kind or in money.
Whatever the level of civilized society, it was, and is, most impor-
tant that members of the community understand both the nature of the
law and the penalties for its breach. The lesson that we derive from all
legal societies is that the clearer the exposition of the law, the more it is
capable of community comprehension. The more extensive this compre-
hension, the more adherence to the law can be expected. The more com-
plete this quality of adherence, the more we approach the ideal balance of
order and liberty.
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IV. THE CRISIS IN THE HousE OF THE LAW
The approach to the ideal balance of order and liberty is sometimes
quite difficult under the common law tradition, because the flexibility of
judicial lawmaking makes it all the more difficult to see the integrity of a
body of law characterized by an explosion of statutes, regulations and
ordinances. Yet one particularly troublesome and idiosyncratic aspect of
today's federal litigation can be isolated. Public authority has usurped
more and more causes and matters that traditionally had been in the
domain of usage and morals. Many things now codified by statute or
regulation previously had been left to social custom, if not to private ca-
price or force. Now regulated by federal legislation and administrative
regulation and refined by courts of justice, these causes of action have
generated an astronomical increase in litigation.
But perhaps the greatest change is what may be described as the
"constitutionalization" of our society. Three distinct, but related, simul-
taneous developments of the past quarter century are responsible for this:
first, the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment;15 3 second, the on-going expansion of the concept of proce-
dural due process;154 and third, the use of section 1983 of the Civil
153. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment right against double
jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (sixth amendment right to compulsory process);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to speedy trial);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment right to confront witnesses); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment right against self incrimination); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949) (fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257 (1948) (sixth amendment right to public trial); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (first amendment establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(first amendment free exercise clause); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (first amendment right to petition government); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937) (first amendment right to assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (first
amendment freedom of press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (first amendment
freedom of speech); Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (fifth
amendment just compensation clause).
154. See, eg., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (short term suspension of student from
public high school implicates both liberty and property interests requiring a predeprivation
hearing); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (interest in a benefit is a "property"
interest for due process purposes if rules or a mutually explicit understanding support claim of
entitlement to the benefit invoked at a hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (in
context of parole revocation, parolee's liberty involved "significant values" within protection
of due process clause); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (government welfare benefits
are entitlements or "property" and procedural due process is applicable to termination).
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Rights Act' as a streamlined entry into the federal courtroom. Karl
Llewellyn predicted fifty years ago that the future emphasis in litigation
would not pit individual against individual, but the individual against the
state.15 6 This prophecy became a reality with Monroe v. Pape'57 and its
prolific progeny.
Even more significant is that federal litigation is now dominated by
what civil law countries traditionally describe as "public law." The di-
chotomy between "public" and "private" law is an inheritance from Ro-
man Law, or more specifically from The Institutes of Emperor Justinian.
"There are two aspects of this study, public and private. Public law is
that which pertains to the Roman state, private that which concerns the
well-being of the individual."' 58
If both coherence and consistency are to exist in the law, it becomes
essential to relate statutes, regulations and case law to a proper antece-
dent discipline-to one of the five supereminent precepts-so that as
members of society we can determine what we can or cannot do. "Law,
such as we know it in the conduct of life, is a matter of fact; not a thing
which can be seen or handled, but a thing perceived in many ways of
practical experience. '  We must at least recognize the law by accus-
tomed signs and works. Most people do not desire to learn the meta-
physical analysis of law or legal duty in general, but do want to know
and are entitled to some certainty about the rules that the judges of the
land will apply. They do not want to know "the why" or "the how" of
the law, but merely "the what." They are entitled to know the general
contours of any dispute between members of the private sector and what
constitutes a civil or criminal offense against the common weal. They
also are entitled to know the price that is to be paid and the manner in
which the decision of a court can be enforced. To this extent, at least, we
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
156. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 464
(1930) ("[T]he focus of study, the point of all things legal has been shifting, and should now be
consciously shifted to the areas of contact, of interaction, between official regulatory behavior
and the behavior of those affecting or affected by official regulatory behavior.").
157. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (eliminated impediments to private litigants bringing actions
against state officials acting under color of law).
158. J. THOMAS, supra note 39, at 3.
159. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArLAND, supra note 2, at xxv.
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lawyers and judges have an obligation to make certain that the lay public
is kept reasonably informed.
If law is an aggregate of the legal precepts that govern society, we
also must say that law is the sum of rules administered by courts of jus-
tice. In the common law tradition, we have never said that the rules
must be, or always are, uniform or consistent. A uniform and consistent
law can be stated as an ideal, but not a reality. Nor is complete symme-
try always desirable, because the primary role of the courts is to do jus-
tice in each particular case. Inherent equities do in fact differ from case
to case, more profoundly in some than in others. Conversely, in some
cases the legal rule does not profess to result in perfect justice. When we
say that in certain disciplines of the law it is better that the law be settled
than be right, we recognize that sometimes certainty is more important
than perfection, and that an imperfect rule may therefore be useful and
acceptable. 16°
If we can agree that substantive law is that which is promulgated by
the sovereign and that in our democracy the people are sovereign and
have delegated law-making power to the legislature, we also can recog-
nize, even within strictures of the separation of powers, that judicial law-
making is acceptable and legitimate because the courts are merely the
subordinates or subjects of the sovereign legislature.
In constitutional law, however, the courts have an even more impor-
tant role, for here the judiciary-especially the federal court of appeals-
is not a mere delegate of the sovereign legislature. Here, not the Con-
gress, not the Executive, but the court itself is the sovereign force of the
people. The awesome importance of a court of of appeals' panel decision
on constitutional law cannot be overemphasized because, more often
than not, a decision by a majority of a three-judge panel is final.
Some statistics illustrate this point. Although our court (the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals) has two separate internal procedures whereby
the panel's decision may be converted into full court consideration, of the
2501 cases filed in fiscal year 1984, only two were heard en banc by the
full court of twelve judges. Moreover, the Supreme Court agreed to con-
sider only eleven, or four-tenths of one percent, of all the cases heard by
the court. If the Constitution is to be considered a statement of moral
rules, then a panel's formulation of the appropriate moral rule thus be-
160. See, eg., Getty Refining & Marketing Co. v. M/T FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir.
1985) ("The long established rule... is a pragmatic limitation imposed by the court upon the
tort doctrine of foreseeability. Concededly, we are drawing a fine line, but this approach has
the virtue of what Holmes called 'predictability' and Llewellyn, 'reckonability,' by saying that
the law shall go thus far and no further.").
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comes the promulgation of positive law of the sovereign, at least for the
millions who inhabit the territory subject to that court.
Although it is important in any case that the court clearly identify
the relevant discipline of law under discussion, this requirement is all the
more imperative in constitutional law if we are to avoid decisions by the
idiosyncratic vagaries of a one-person panel majority. When ethereal
moral ideas are transferred to the reinforced concrete of constitutional
dogma, the rules that emerge constitute, in the fullest sense of the word,
imperative commands of the sovereign.
I submit the five supereminent principles, not as a taxonomic exer-
cise for academia, for but the very pragmatic purpose of suggesting that
federal decisional law would be much clearer if lawyers and judges would
always first indicate the specific legal discipline involved in the case; next,
outline arguments to fit the demands and defenses available under that
discipline; and then relate the relevant controversy to it.
Some modem litigation is extremely complex and complicated, but
this is mostly a function of complex and complicated facts. The legal
precepts that govern these facts often are not themselves obtuse or eso-
teric, no matter how convoluted the facts. If the precepts do become
obtuse or esoteric it is because the theory of the claim or defense is so
innovative that the court is asked to bend legal fundamentals beyond the
breaking point. Many, if not most, fundamental legal precepts in opera-
tion today are based on the experience of hundreds, if not thousands, of
years. When left uncluttered, unadorned and simply stated, these
precepts have a time-tested hierarchy of their own, with special grada-
tions ranging from the broad maxims and dogmas through doctrines and
principles to rules in the very narrow sense.
As we have seen, these precepts also have a history of their own, a
history that reflects the changes of recent years. In our own system, we
have seen community values change from a desire to expand and protect
commerce, industry and our health professions to a desire to protect con-
sumers. We have seen our substantive law transmuted in the transition
from liberal laissez faire governments to modem social welfare states
with planned or regulated economies. Case law, in the common law tra-
dition, has lost ground to congressional statute and agency regulation.
Judicial decisions have become increasingly detached from their moor-
ings as precedent. Administrative law has encroached on all pre-existing
sources of law. "We have entered the age of legislation triumphant, the
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judge militant, and bureaucracy rampant." 161
Thus, the starting point for analysis must be to locate and identify
that which is governed or regulated, not to trudge wildly into semantic
marshes where abide ambiguous statute or agency regulation. Heydon's
Case of 1584162 may be long in the tooth, but its bite is still mighty
strong. That case, you will recall, announced the mischief rule of statu-
tory construction. It posed these questions: What was the law before the
making of the Act? What was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide? To tailor these questions to circumstances
that occur four centuries later is still a good idea. If nothing else, these
questions return us in every case to relevant fundamentals. They remind
us that on proportion the classic whole depends.
And, if we keep hold of proportion, we can travel far in our quest
for the manifest purpose of the statute or regulation. As Lord Diplock
has said, we must make "a purposive approach to the Act as a whole to
ascertain the social ends it was intended to achieve and the practical
means by which it was expected to achieve them." '163
We should agree that what we wish to see in the house of the law are
predictability and continuity, yet flexibility and growth. We know that
these make up the basic framework of our house. We also know that
through the years we maintain these lines by the traditional mechanism
of case law. But the task has not always been easy because inherent de-
signs in the law--even first principles-do conflict. A great keeper of our
house, Dean Roscoe Pound, reminded us that the law must be stable, yet
it must not stand still.16  Traditionally, we have resolved the conflict
between the Yin and the Yang by the rationality found in case law. Rea-
son is the catalyst that harmonizes growth with predictability.
Yet we also know that the explosion of federal regulatory law has
shattered traditional mechanisms, our traditional ways of doing things.
The shatter has come because modern congressional statutes generally
are neither stable nor particularly rational. Legislatively-declared law
need not be supported by principled or systematic reasons. Frequent
amendments do not introduce much flexibility either, because it is not in
the nature of the political process to enact or amend legislation on a rea-
soned or principled basis. Positive law, the command of the sovereign,
need not be based on morals, right reason or natural law.
161. M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 240
(1985).
162. 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584).
163. Regina v. National Ins. Comm'rs, 1972 A.C. 944, 1005.
164. R. POUND, THE SPIRrr OF THE COMMON LAW 184-85 (1921).
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These are but the brute facts of our tripartite system of government,
an aspect of modem political science that puts the federal bench and bar
to the test of resolving not only a particular dispute, but also a broader-
based social conflict. To be sure, society's demands in these waning years
of the twentieth century, as reflected by statute, enactment or regulation
promulgation, have produced results that alter the symmetry of an inher-
ited system under which you and I have been trained.165 But these de-
mands are not fatal to consistency or predictability in the law. To be
equally sure, their first import usually produces some disturbance of ac-
cepted notions.
Repeated innovations necessarily produce stress on formal organiza-
tions and even some distrust of conceptual reasoning in the law. But
while
the effect in peripheral cases and in the views of peripheral
commentators or interpreters is . . .drastic, . . . so far as the
bulk of the lawyers, judges, commentators and teachers are
concerned, there is a continuous striving to achieve a fresh con-
sistency or symmetry rather than an abandonment of concep-
tual reasoning.
6 6
It is to this continuous striving that we, the federal practitioners and the
federal judiciary, must dedicate our efforts.
I do not suggest that this will always be easy. In many cases, it is
difficult to reach a conclusion that affords justice to the litigants and at
the same time satisfies the competing demands of growth and stability.
But though the conclusion may be difficult, the initial approach in each
case is clear. First, to identify the family of law implicated-property,
liberty interest, fulfilling promises, redressing damages caused by fault or
breach or criminal law. Next, where applicable, to either identify the
rule at common law and ascertain the mischief that the statute or regula-
tion sought to eliminate, or to ascertain the change in federal law sought
by statutory or regulatory amendments. Such initial inquiry sets the
legal mood or tone of the case. It forms the conceptual backdrop against
which the case or controversy may properly be judged and pinpoints pre-
cisely the activity sought to be restricted by statutory or agency regula-
tion. The eloquent Oliver Wendell Holmes may have exaggerated, but
only slightly, when he said: "You must see the infinite, i.e., the universal,
165. Such demands include changes in pension contracts under ERISA, new civil actions
under RICO, new bankruptcy laws, constant refinements of fourth amendment interpretation,
and the imaginative nuances of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.
166. M. GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE, supra note 161, at 29.
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in your particular, or it is only gossip." 6
V. CONCLUSION
This, then, is my personal view of the federal judiciary's house on
the eve of the bicentennial of both the Constitution and the Judiciary Act
of 1789. I have described a house that is in no danger of collapse, yet one
to which the lawyers and the judges must turn a hand to make it more
attractive, if not more secure. The lawyers can do this by their written
briefs and oral arguments; the judges, by their statements of reasons. In
the final analysis, the housekeeping and the appearance of our house are
in our hands, not those of Congress. It will be our hands that determine
its ultimate design. 6 8
167. W.H. AUDEN & L. KRONENBERGER, THE VIKING BOOK OF APHORISMS 339 (1981).
168. Many tributes have been paid to the house of the law, but probably none as extrava-
gant as that of Lord Henry Brougham in 1828 in a celebrated speech in Parliament on law
reform:
It was the boast of Augustus... that he found Rome of brick, and left it of marble
.... But how much nobler will be the Sovereign's boast when he shall have it to say
that he found law dear, and left it cheap; found it in a sealed book-left it a living
letter; found it the patrimony of the rich-left it the inheritance of the poor; found it
the two-edged sword of craft and oppression-left it the staff of honesty and the
shield of innocence!
A. DENNING, WHAT NEXT IN THE LAW 28 (1982) (quoting Lord Henry Brougham).
